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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 09/02/2008

Accident number: 563

Accident time: 12:28

Accident Date: 05/07/2007

Where it occurred: Area 8-003 CBU 434,
Nr Tyre, Tayr Debba
Municipality, Sur Subdistrict, El-Jenoub
Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Lebanon

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: 07/2007

Date of main report: 12/07/2007
Name of source: UNMAS

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: DPICM M77
submunition

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
dry/dusty
metal fragments
rocks/stones
steep slope
Date last modified: 09/02/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: UTM 710383-684790

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
pressure to work quickly (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
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visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in February 2008 as a collection of files and
pictures. Its conversion to a DDAS file means that some of the original formatting has been
lost. The substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original files
are held on record. Text in [ ] is editorial. Deminers in Lebanon are often called “Searchers”.

BOI Investigation report
Ref: 07/2007
Reference:
a. Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSG’s)
b. International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
c.

[International commercial demining agency] Standard Operational Procedures
(SOPs)

d. Map: UNIFIL JENIMAP
e. MACC SL Mine / UXO information

1. Introduction
In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG), the MACC SL
Programme Manager, [Name removed] and Lt.Col. [Name removed], LMAC Representative,
issued a Verbal Convening Order on Thursday the 5th July 2007, for an accident investigation
Board of Inquiry (BOI). The MACC SL Board members are Lt. [Name removed], LAF Plans
Officer and [Name removed], QA Officer MACC SL.
This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry (BOI) team into the Accident on the
5th of July 2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation, statements from [International
commercial demining agency] personnel involved in the accident, evidence from the accident
site and the [International commercial demining agency] Demining Accident report. The
accident is considered preventable.
The [International commercial demining agency] BAC Accident report was forward to the
MACC SL BOI team on 12th July 2007, and is attached at Annex A [Follows this report]. The
time of the accident was 1228hrs on the 5th July 2007 in Area 8-001, BAC site, CBU 434,
UTM 710383 –684790, which is located near the village of Tayr-Dibba, approximately 7
kilometres north east of Tyre.
The BOI is an impartial investigation conducted by the MACC SL on behalf of the Lebanon
Mine Action Centre (LMAC) Lebanon. The primary objective of the BOI is to examine
evidence in order to conclude the cause of the accident and make recommendations for the
prevention of further accidents.
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2. Executive Summary
On the 5th July 2007 at 1228hrs, two [International commercial demining agency] BAC
searchers were involved in an accident, which was caused by an uncontrolled detonation of
an M77 sub-munitions. The detonation took place during a period when all searchers were
not conducting search/clearance operations but were preparing to start work after a 10
minutes rest period.
As a result of the explosion the two searchers sustained non-life treating injuries from the
detonation of the M77. The injuries and injured are: [Victim No.1] received injures to his
ankle/leg area and buttocks and [Victim No.2] who suffered a deep cut on his thigh and minor
injuries to his head. Immediately after the detonation both searches ran towards the CP, and
were restrained by the TL who commenced medical treatment.
It is of the opinion of the BOI that the searcher, [Victim No.1], was conducting unauthorised,
BAC search/clearance operations when the sub-munitions detonated. [International
commercial demining agency] SOPs were not followed by the two searchers, however it is
inconclusive as to the exact cause of the sub-munition’s detonation i.e. whether or not the
cluster ammunition was initiated by the [Victim No.1]’s right foot when he slipped from the
steep terrain causing the sub-munitions to detonate or if [Victim No.1] slipped and his foot
made contact with the partially buried sub-munitions causing it to detonate or the submunitions exploded when [Victim No.1] was a few metres away.
The task site, CBU 434, is a combination of both flat and steep terrain, with the steep areas
requiring greater planning to allow searchers to conduct clearance in a safe manner.

[The site on the steep side of a ridge. The point of detonation is roughly central in the
photograph below.]
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Based on all evidence, the BOI concludes that the immediate response to the accident by the
team leader and the treatment by the medics enabled an effective casevac and subsequent
medevac from the task site to Jabel Amel Hospital and then to Hammoud Hospital.
It is recommended that [International commercial demining agency] conduct a one day of
refresher training for BAC Team 3, specifically revising all safety requirements and BAC drills.
Special consideration should be taken for revision and reinforcement of the command and
control requirements by Site Supervisors/TL when searchers are conducting BAC clearance
operations, marking of cleared and un-cleared areas should be emphasized to all members of
the team as described in [International commercial demining agency] SOP and marking
method of the progressive clearance should be high lightened.
Based on the available information, evidence gathered at the accident site and interview
statements, it is of the BOI’s opinion that clearance activities on terraced areas should be
given special focus. It is clear that if the correct safety measures and command and control
procedures were undertaken correctly the accident would not have occurred. Therefore the
accident is considered preventable.

3. Location of Accident
Area of accident: Area 8-003 CBU 434, Tayr-Dibba, District-Tyre, Prov-Aljanoub, UTM
710557-684699
11. Date and time of investigation: 5 July 2007, 1245hrs
12. Execution of Investigation
Approach to Site
The accident site is located at IMSMA Clearance Task Number: CBU 434 which is located
approximately 7Km north-east of Tyre, in an olive grove, adjacent to a steel factory, 1.5km
east of Tayr-Dibba village.
The MACC SL investigation team comprising Lt. [Name removed] and [Name removed] drove
to the accident site, Lt. [Name removed] travelled with [Name removed] the senior QA officer.
The journey took approx. 10 minutes. On arrival at the site, the site supervisor welcomed and
briefed the BOI team at the control point. The BOI team was then escorted to the accident
site. No additional clearance was required to allow inspection of the accident site, as the area
had been previously cleared
CBU 434 stretches from an orange plantation to the north and south to terraced areas
containing olive trees. A steel factory located within the strike area.
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A [International commercial demining agency] EOD Team was located at the CP during the
time of accident and the EOD supervisor informed the BOI during the interview that he is the
person who reported the accident to the [International commercial demining agency] radio
room. He then handed over to the situation to the site supervisor to coordinate the accident
evacuation procedures.
The [International commercial demining agency] site supervisor, [Name removed], informed
the BOI that the site had been secured while waiting for the BOI to arrive at the site and no
disturbance of the site had occurred during this period. Photos of the accident site were taken
by the BOI during the investigation.
13. Evidence on the Ground
Accident Site
The accident occurred inside the olive plantation, on a steep terraced area south west of the
main control point (CP). The CP which is located at the steel factory.
The two searchers were deployed from 0700hrs to commence operations in this area of the
olive plantation. [International commercial demining agency] BAC Team 3 continued work
with regular 10 min rest breaks during 50 min of operations, until the time of accident.
•

Searcher number one ([Victim No.2]) was deployed on his box to conduct sub-surface
clearance by the team leader.

•

[Victim No.2] completed this task at 1210hrs and he informed his team leader.

•

The two searchers remained together during break time.

•

After the break the two searchers returned to conduct operations, this is when an
uncontrolled detonation happened, resulting on both searchers sustaining injuries:
[Victim No.2] a deep cut on his thigh and cut to his head. [Victim No.1] suffered
injuries to his right ankle and a deep cut on his right buttocks.

•

Blood stains were seen on stones 20cm from what is believed to be the seat of
detonation.

•

The hand tool used for grass cutting was seen lying on the rock almost 2m below
from the seat of detonation to the west.

•

Signs of shrapnel from a shaped charge were evident approx. 1.5m to the south east
from the seat of detonation.

•

The cell phone and the sunhat belonging to [Victim No.2] were identified 5m to the
north west below the site of detonation.

•

The area where the detonation happened did not support the facts that the BAC subsurface procedures in accordance with [International commercial demining agency]
SOPs were being employed on the site.

•

The visor, detector and the knee pads were located adjacent to the sunhat 5m from
the seat of detonation.

•

The surrounding cleared area indicates that a number of sub-munitions,M77s had
been located and destroyed, as the red/yellow topped pickets were seen on the upper
terrace 2m from the seat of detonation.

•

The box where the detonation happened was marked on three sides only.
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•

There was no marking evident at the site indicating in which area current clearance
was being conducted.

Crater
No crater was evident at the site of detonation, however there was approximately 50cm of
ground disturbance. Blood stains were seen on a stone 20cm from the area of the disturbed
ground. The BOI where able to view the detonation site/area from a point of 1.5m.

14. Vehicle(s) and Equipment
Ambulance
Three ambulances were positioned at the CP to support the three teams BAC teams, 3, 4 and
6. Additional support would have been provided from the EOD ambulances (3) and medics
which were located at the CP during the time of accident.
Detectors
[Victim No.2]
The BOI found [Victim No.2]’s detector was 50m from the seat of the detonation. The detector
was turned off and positioned adjacent to his equipment. The transit case of the detector was
located 30m from the seat of detonation.
[Victim No.1]
[Victim No.1]’s schonstadt was positioned 5m to the north west below the seat of detonation.
There was no evidence of damage to the equipment. The schonstadt was in the turned off
mode. The BOI concludes that the detector was not in use during the time of accident, as the
schonstadt showed no evidence of damage.
Demining Tools
[Victim No.1]
BAC hand tools were found scattered approx. 5m from the bottom of the terrace wall approx.
5m from the seat of detonation. One grass cutter was found together with a tool bag, the other
grass cutter was found inside the box positioned on top of a rock.
The hand trowel was located closer to the detector and there were no damages evident on
this tool. Searcher, [Victim No.1] informed the BOI that the only tool he was using was the
grass cutter and when the explosion happened he was no longer using it as he was removing
vegetation from the uncleared area to a previously cleared area.
[Victim No.2]
The tools of [Victim No.2] were positioned almost 50m away from the seat of detonation. The
only tool which was located with [Victim No.1]’s hand tools was a grass cutter. However it is
not clear which one of two grass cutters belonging to [Victim No.1] or [Victim No.2].
Base Stick
[Victim No.1]
The base stick was located approx. 5m north of the seat of detonation and no damage was
evident on it. It was confirmed by the searcher that he was not using the base stick during the
time of accident.
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[Victim No.2]
The base stick belonging to [Victim No.2] was found together with the rest of his BAC
equipment approx. 50m from the seat of explosion.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Ballistic Visor
[Victim No.1]
[Victim No.1]’s visor was located approx 5m from the seat of detonation. The visor was
inspected during the investigation and there were no evidence of any damage to it.
Dust/dirt was located on the inner side of the visor and it was positioned in such away that the
inner side was facing the direction of the detonation is believed to have occurred.
It is inconclusive as to whether searcher ([Victim No.1]) was putting on his visor during the
time of detonation as the injuries he sustained were to his right ankle and his right buttock and
nothing on the left leg/side.

[The undamaged visor.]

[The unused protective apron.]
[Victim No.2]
[Victim No.2] was not wearing any PPE during the time of detonation; all his personnel
equipment including his PPE was located in one area approx. 50m from the seat of
detonation.
Ballistic Body Armour
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[Victim No.1]
PPE armour was located at the position where the casualty ([Victim No.1]) received medical
support. No blood stains were identified on the PPE and the body armour was not damaged.
During the investigation the site supervisor and the medic acknowledges that [Victim No.1]
was wearing his PPE and that they are the ones who remove it during treatment.
Knee pads
Knee pads were seen scattered approx. 5m to the north of the seat of detonation. [Victim
No.1] was not wearing them when accident occurred.
14.1 Explosive Ordnance
CBU 434 is an area which was subjected to the Israeli strikes during the recent Lebanon
Israel conflict. Numerous M77s are located in and around the surrounds of the plantation of
Tayr-Dibba village.
During the clearance of CBU 434 there is evidence of un-exploded M77 and shrapnel from
ammunition was located. The team had located 68 x M77s.
14.2 Casualty(s) (position, clothing)
Casualty’s Positions
It is assumed by the BOI that the searcher [Victim No.1] was walking on a downward slope to
place the already cut vegetation 5m from the seat of detonation, where it is possible that
searcher [Victim No.2] was standing.
[Victim No.1] is believed to have been moving from the working area and accidentally slipped
on the steep ground disturbing the partially buried M77, causing it to function.
The injuries [Victim No.1] suffered were around the rear of his right ankle.
[Victim No.2] suffered a deep cut on his left thigh and sustained minor injuries on his head.
[Victim No.2] told the BOI that he was approx. 30m from [Victim No.1] when the accident
occurred. However looking at the location of his equipment, which was close to the seat of
detonation, the BOI is not convinced by this statement.
The BOI has assumed that [Victim No.2] was possibility approx. 5m from the blast, as his
equipment, cell phone, sunhat and grass cutting tool was found approx. 5m from the seat of
detonation.
Casualty’s Clothing
Clothing which was located at the place of stabilization belonged to [Victim No.2].
The trousers of [Victim No.2] were cut and removed by the other team members to allow
medical support to be administered.
No clothing was seen for [Victim No.1] in this area.
14.3 Interviews
The following [International commercial demining agency] personnel were interviewed in this
sequence by the MACC SL BOI on the 5th, 6th and 9th of July 2007.
14.4 Casualty Information
The following information regarding the accident of the two searchers ([the Victims]) was
obtained by the BOI during interviews conducted at the [International commercial demining
agency], Tyre office:
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Medic’s diagnosis at accident site on 05 July 2007
The casualty [Victim No.2] suffered injuries in the front of his thigh and a deep cut on the rear/
top of his head. The team leader arrived first and undertook first aid, prior to the arrival of the
medics.
When the medics arrived they stabilized the casualty and escorted him to hospital.
[Victim No.1] suffered from deep cuts on his right ankle and light bruises to his right arm
around the elbow.
The senior medic treated [Victim No.1] while the two remaining medics treated [Victim No.2].
The medics stopped the bleeding from [Victim No.1] and at around 1239hrs transported him
to Jabel Amel Hospital, Tyre.
14.5 Accident Details (Circumstances / Sequence of Events)
The following information is based on an assessment of the evidence obtained by the MACC
SL BOI team at the accident site and from witness statements:
On 5th July 2007 between 1228hrs and 1230hrs, two [International commercial demining
agency] searchers [Victim No.1] and [Victim No.2] were involved in an accident during BAC
search operations in task CBU 434 which resulted in them sustaining injuries. [Victim No.1]
suffered severe injuries closer to his ankle and a deep cut on his right buttock and [Victim
No.2] suffered injuries on his head and to the front of his thigh. The accident was reported by
the [International commercial demining agency] Headquarters, Tyre, to the MACC SL
Operations, Tyre.
It is not clear as to the exact time of the accident as there is a discrepancy between the above
times. The [International commercial demining agency] Radio Operator’s initial report to the
MACC SL Communications Room (which is written in the MACCSL radio log) and the IMSMA
casualty report submitted by [International commercial demining agency] indicate that it was
1230 hrs. Witness statements indicate it happened at 1223hrs and others indicate 1228hrs,
with the supervisor saying 1228hrs in his briefing. The [International commercial demining
agency] Demining Accident report indicates 1228hrs. Additional information regarding the
timing gathered during the interview process indicate that it is most likely that the accident
occurred at 1228hrs, therefore, unless proven to the contrary, 1228hrs shall be detailed as
the time of accident.
At 0700, [International commercial demining agency] BAC Team 3 was co-located with Team
6 and commenced operations at apporx.0715hrs. Due to the size of the area, the teams were
split into three groups of three searchers and two groups of two searchers, being led by an
international site supervisor and three section leaders. The team started work at 0715hrs and
the team leader [Name removed] was in charge of the two group’s, one with three searchers
and the other team with two searchers (this included the two victims). The teams working with
[Name removed] were deployed approx. 100m apart.
Prior to commencing operations the site supervisor informed the BOI that a daily briefing was
conducted at the control point by himself, pertaining to the safety procedures; marking and
proper BAC drills as per Organization SOPs.
The working routine of one hour work in the field, including a 10mins break, at the designated
rest area for each individual team continued until the time of accident. During the time of
accident the supervisor and the team leader were located at the control point.
On hearing the detonation the supervisor together with the EOD team supervisor looked to
identify its location. Moving along the road he met [Victim No.2] lying down on the road
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bleeding. [International commercial demining agency] HQ was immediately informed. The
team leader was the first person to reach the casualty, rendering first aid. The supervisor
informed the BOI that when they were going to the field to check for the other searchers they
met [Victim No.1] putting on the flack jacket heading towards the CP. The searcher was
asked to lie down and the supervisor called the medic to attend to him. The second searcher
[Victim No.1] was medically checked at 1233hrs in a previously cleared area. A 1240hrs the
ambulance left for Jabel Amal Hospital. The casualties were both refereed to Hamoud
Hospital in Saida for further examination. On the 6th July the two searchers were released
from Hospital.
The interviews of the two searchers were conducted on Monday the 9th July 2007.
a. The BOI together with the [International commercial demining agency] Internal QA
Officer were briefed by the site supervisor about the accident at the CP.
b. During the briefing the site supervisor, [Name removed] clearly maintained that the
two searchers were not working at the time of accident however that they were
preparing to commence operations.
c.

The supervisor briefed the BOI that the two searchers were clearing up the slope
before the time of accident.

d. The site supervisor also maintained that the site marking was done as per
organization SOPs.
On visiting the accident site the BOI discovered that the situation on the ground was not the
same as detailed in the brief by the site supervisor. The following were the points which are
contrary to the supervisors briefing.
The BOI team was briefed by the site supervisor that the accident happened when the
searchers were not working but preparing to commence operations, as had been planned,
however talking to the searchers during the interview and considering the evidence physically
on the ground it is of the opinion of the BOI that one searcher was working and the other was
standing at approx 5m away. This supported by the evidence of the blood stains which is
considered by the BOI as the blood from [Victim No.1]. [Victim No.2]’s sun hat with holes on
the top was located 5m from the seat of explosion.

15. Geography and Climate
The accident happened on a clear sunny day temperatures were approx. 30 degrees. The
surrounding area contains orchard plantations with the local community approx. 1.5m towards
the south [presumably km].
The area is undulating and it was very dry at the time of the explosion.
15.1 Communications
VHF radios are used to communicate at the task between the Team Leaders, Supervisor and
Medics. VHF radios and mobile phones are used for communications between the task and
operational base at Tyre.
The MACC SL Operations Room had been informed by [International commercial demining
agency] Operations Room.
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15.2

Site Layout and Marking

The immediate area where the accident occurred was not marked in accordance with
[International commercial demining agency] SOPs. The only marking was to the boundary
marking of the box.
The blue picket, start of work, was in place where the searchers were tasked to commence
work at the beginning of the day’s operations. Red and yellow pickets were seen outside the
perimeter in previously cleared area. No marking of the clearance lane was in place; the rope
was rolled and closer to the rest of the equipment which was not in use before the time of
accident. The only other marking which was identified out of the work area was one red
topped 60cm picket. No correct demarcation of the safe and un-safe was in place.
In [Victim No.2]’s area of responsibility the only marking which were left on the ground was
the blue topped picket and the rest of the pickets were removed due to the completion of his
work.
15.3 Command and Control
Two teams, BAC Team 6 and 3 were operating at task CBU 434 and Team 3 was split into
three smaller sub-sections of 2 x 2 searchers each and 1x 3 three searchers. Team 6 was
working simultaneously on the same CBU. Each sub-section commanded by a team leader. A
supervisor was in overall command of the task and the control point was situated a safe
distance from the nearest working searcher. All searchers were working at the correct safety
distance and although the nature of the terrain may not allow the team leaders to see all the
searchers simultaneously, it is possible for them to monitor all searchers regularly. There was
an adequate amount of safe lanes enabling effective access to each working searcher for
casevac purposes.
According to information gathered during the interview process, the casualty had been
checked by the team medic prior to the commencement of work before the accident. The site
supervisor only visited the site before the searchers started work in the field. The team leader
checked the searchers twice from the time of deployment until approx. two hours before the
time of accident.

16 Planning
CBU 434 is part of the task dossier 8-001 which was issued to [International commercial
demining agency] as part of the cluster clearance in South Lebanon. Clearance started the
14th of May 2007.
Accreditation
[International commercial demining agency] BAC Team 3 has received Full Operational
Accreditation from the LMAC/MACC SL.
Training
Team 3, like all [International commercial demining agency] BAC Teams had recently been
re-organized, with combined revision training being conduced on the 30th June 2007, this
also included a casevac exercise. On Monday the 2nd July the team was conducting a
casevac exercise/drills.

11

17 Details of Non / Compliance to Agency SOP / NTSG / IMAS
BAC drills were not conducted in according with the organization SOPs on CBU 434 by the
searchers involved in the accident. The evidence viewed by the BOI was that the searcher
[Victim No.1] worked without proper boundary markings, safety distance from searchers,
without PPE, marking of the lanes where clearance is in progress was not in place and the
use of cell phones while working. There was a lack of command and control of searchers
during the execution of their duties, with the site supervisor located in the CP from the start of
operations. Also the team leader failed to identify and correct faults until after the accident
happened.

18 Conclusions
a. It is the opinion of the BOI that [Victim No.1] a BAC searcher for [International
commercial demining agency], inadvertently caused an item of explosive ordnance,
which is considered to be an M77 sub-munition, to function while conducting BAC
operations. Information gathered during the interview process indicates that [Victim
No.1] was carrying cut vegetation which he removed from the area he was working
and that he stepped near the M77 causing loose items on the ground the detonation
the M77. The BOI further conclude that [Victim No.2] was standing approx. 5m from
the seat of explosion when accident happened.
b. As a result of the explosion [Victim No.1] and [Victim No.2] sustained non life
threatening injuries. [Victim No.1] suffered a deep cut above his right heel and
bruising on the right arm around the elbow area. [Victim No.2] suffered a deep cut on
his left thigh and injuries on his head. The BOI team concludes that searcher [Victim
No.1] was walking down towards [Victim No.2] and then in the process he slipped and
initiated the partially buried M77, injuring himself and [Victim No.2] who is believed by
the BOI to have been 5m from the explosion. This is supported by the evidence
obtained at the accident site during investigations: the location of equipment and
other items belonging to [Victim No.1] were found near to the seat of explosion. Both
searchers were evacuated to Jabal Amel hospital then to Hamoud Hospital in Saida.
Due to a [International commercial demining agency] re-organization the team leader
had completed 5 operational working days with this new team.
c.

There is no discipline problems were identified by either the supervisor or the team
leader.

d. CBU 434 was known to contain sub-munitions (M77).
e. The BOI concludes that the team leader had knowledge of the actions of the
searchers and he failed to correct them.
f.

The BOI also concludes that the searchers were in a hurry to clear the area and by
doing so breached safety.

g. The site supervisor had limited idea about the operations on his site. This was
confirmed by his brief of the events of the accident and site operations which were
not reflected when a visit by the BOI to the accident site was conducted. In additional
the site supervisor had not physically visited the working operations from the start of
the day.
h. The BOI concludes that the searchers did not want to reveal the truth of the matter as
to what caused the accident and their activities during time of accident. The working
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distance between each of the searchers involved in the accident, is based on the
evidence viewed on the ground e.g. broken cell phone, sun hat and the grass cutting
tool for [Victim No.2] which was located 5m from the seat of explosion.
i.

The searchers were working on a steep incline without the necessary steps for them
to conduct safe clearance procedures.

j.

Due to many differences in timings of the accident, the accident is considered to have
occurred at 1228hrs.

k.

There was insufficient command and control at task CBU 434.

l.

BAC drills at CBU 434 were NOT conducted in accordance with the [International
commercial demining agency] SOP.

m. The accident is considered to be preventable.

19 Recommendations
The BOI agree with the recommendations identified in the [International commercial demining
agency] internal investigation report, attached at Annex A, [see below] dated 12th Jul 07 and
recommend the following addition area be addressed in addition to the internal [International
commercial demining agency] report recommendations:
a. The site supervisor [Name removed] and the Team Leader [Name removed], receive
a written warning regarding his lack of supervision and command and control of the
operations on this site.
b. Extreme care should be taken when working on difficult steep terrain. Steps should
be made on steep area for searchers to have balance when conducting clearance.
c.

Extreme vigilance and regular monitoring of searchers should be enforced when
conducting BAC, by site supervisors and TL.

d. Searchers separated to different teams and should also be reminded on the safety
requirement related to smoking and the use of mobile phone when conducting
operations (these should be removed when conducting search operations).
e. Supervisory staff should ensure that PPE is worn correctly at all times when working
in the hazardous area; this should be followed up by [International commercial
demining agency] internal QA requirements.
Report Written By: QA Officer, MACC SL
Report Agreed By: AF Plans Officer, LMAC/MACC SL

Internal report
REPORT ON A BATTLE AREA CLEARANCE ACCIDENT
AT CBU 434
UTM 710383-684790 ON 05 JULY 2007
References:
A. Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs).
B. International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
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C. [International commercial demining agency] International Limited Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs).

Introduction
1. A Battle Area Clearance (BAC) accident occurred at CBU 434 at 12:28hrs on 05 July 2007
when [International commercial demining agency] BAC searchers, [Victim No.1] and [Victim
No.2], were conducting BAC clearance drills in a M77 sub-munition strike area. An
uncontrolled detonation took place resulting in injuries to these two searchers.

Clearance Site description
2. BAC teams 3, 4 and 6 deployed to carry out BAC clearance on CBU 401 / 434 near Tayr
Dibbah in Area 8 (sub-area 8-001) of the UNOPS project, South Lebanon. This BAC task is
being conducted in an area contaminated with sub-munitions after the 2006 armed conflict
between Lebanon and Israel. The task dossier record indicates it contains M42 submunitions, but [International commercial demining agency] has found 68 X M77 so far during
clearance. The soil in the task area has medium levels of metal contamination and has thick
vegetation in certain areas; the task site also has a metal fabrication factory located at the
centre, as a result some areas are heavily contaminated with scrap metal and raw metal
stores. The clearance methodology used is instrumental subsurface clearance down to 10cm
and visual surface search in certain areas; all drills being used are as described in
[International commercial demining agency] LSOP and is been carried out in accordance with
this SOP.

Sequence of Events
3. Events leading up to the accident:
BAC teams 3, 4 and 6 deployed to CBU 401 / 434 and arrived on site at 06:39hrs. This was
under the supervision of [Name removed], the site supervisor for this task. BAC team 3 has
been working on this site since 14/05/07. On 08/06/07 BAC team 4 joined them and on
11/06/07 BAC team 6 joined them on the site.
4. The team tested their locators and made their equipment ready and then received a safety
brief from [Name removed]. The focus of this briefing was safety (vegetation cutting /
excavation drills), locator checks and medical checkups (see Annex B part 4: Daily
Worksheets for complete info).
5. The teams deployed into the BAC area. However due to the restriction of work space
caused by locals spraying insecticide the teams were split into different areas.
6. The work shifts was as follows:
07H08 Supervisor conducts site inspection
07H15 – 08H10 Start of work first shift
08h20 – 09H22 2nd shift and 1x M 77 located
09H35 – 10H40 3rd shift and 3 x M 77 located
11h10 – 12H00 4th shift
12h10 – 12H28 5th shift and work stopped because of uncontrolled detonation.
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This information was extracted from the daily worksheet (See Annex B part 4: Daily work
sheet).
7. The team leader of BAC 3 [Name removed] was placed in control of the area to the southwest of the metal factory and he was responsible for the supervision of the two searchers [the
Victims] working on the uncleared boxes of vegetation on the walls of the areas between
terrace 1 and terrace 2.
8. At the start of the fifth shift, one searcher, [Victim No.2], had finished his area, and was told
by the team leader [Name removed] to pack up his equipment and to be ready to move to a
new area. The other searcher, [Victim No.1], was told to continue work in his area.
9. The team leader had just left the area to find a new area to place [Victim No.2] when an
uncontrolled detonation occurred in the area that he just left (approximate time: 12:28hrs).

Description of the Accident
10. [Victim No.1] was conducting vegetation cutting from both the top and bottom of the
terrace wall using the safe areas from which to conduct this drill. The uncontrolled detonation
occurred when he moved vegetation that was cut.
11. He heard the detonation, not realising that it was in his lane; he then saw that [Victim
No.2] was injured, and moved down towards him.
12. When [Victim No.1] got to the bottom of the terrace, [Victim No.2] had already walked out
towards the base lane, and he followed him when he realised that he was also injured.

Medical treatment and Casualty evacuation procedure
13. Medic [Name removed] and medic [Name removed] conducted all required medical
procedures on [Victim No.2]; they dressed all the injuries, put in a Ringer IV line, administered
oxygen and placed a neck collar on the victim.
14. Medic Dr [Name removed] conducted all required medical procedures on [Victim No.1]; he
dressed all the injuries, put in a Ringer IV line, administered oxygen and placed a neck collar
on the victim.
15. The casualties were then moved towards the emergency vehicles under the control of the
team leader ([Name removed]) and Dr [Name removed].
16. At 12:38hrs the first ambulance left the site, and at 12:40hrs the second ambulance left
the site on route to Jabal Amel hospital.
17. The casualties were accompanied by the Assistant Medical coordinator [Name removed]
in the first ambulance.
18. [Name removed] then instructed the rest of the team members to close their lanes and
retrieve their equipment and also to close the accident lane and to leave all items
undisturbed.
19. The casualties arrived at Jabal Amel at 12:46hrs and 12:48hrs respectively, which is the
designated nearest hospital for casualty stabilisation. The [International commercial demining
agency] paramedics assisted by the hospital staff then changed the dressings and reassessed the victims in a sterile area.
20. A CT-scan was done on [Victim No.2] and fragmentation could be seen in his wounds.
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21. At 14:00hrs both casualties were loaded back into the ambulances for transportation to
the Hammoud Hospital in Saida.
22. At 14:36hrs the casualties arrived at the Hammoud Hospital and were handed over to the
waiting Emergency response staff and the [International commercial demining agency]
casualty evacuation procedure ended.

Follow Up investigation of the accident
23. At CBU 434 the initial accident investigation began with [International commercial
demining agency] QA supervisor [Name removed] assisted by [International commercial
demining agency] Ops manager [Name removed]. The scene of the accident was
photographed and left untouched for the MACC SL/LMAC investigation team.
24. The MACC SL/LMAC investigation team arrived at about 13:45hrs. This consisted of
MACC SL QA officer’s [Name removed] & [Name removed]. They were joined by Lt [Name
removed] of the LMAC. They were briefed by [Name removed] and the site supervisor [Name
removed] and then escorted to the accident scene. Here they made notes and took
photographs and then returned to the control point to question the team members involved in
the accident.
25. The 4 X M77 that were found that day, were marked and left to be destroyed the following
day.

Casualties’ details
26. Casualty one:
Name: [Victim No.2] – BAC 028
Position: Searcher
Experience: He has worked with [International commercial demining agency] International
from 01 Oct 2006 in South Lebanon on the UNOPS project.
27. Casualty two:
Name: [Victim No.1] – BAC 030
Position: Searcher
Experience: He has worked with [International commercial demining agency] International
from 01 Oct 2006 in South Lebanon on the UNOPS project.

Description of injuries:
28. Casualty one: [Victim No.2] Minor injuries to left & right thighs, right arm, left forearm and
head.
29. Casualty two: [Victim No.1] Minor injuries to right leg and the right buttock.

Conclusions
30. Based on the statements and the visit to the site the investigating officer concludes the
following:
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Both searchers involved in the accident were fully trained, accredited and experienced
searchers familiar with the site and had just taken a rest break.
[Victim No.1]:
•

He was conducting vegetation cutting (in full PPE) at the top of the terrace when the
uncontrolled detonation occurred; it could not be confirmed that he searched the
vegetation with his locator for sub-munitions before conducting the vegetation cutting;
his locator was found in the ‘Off’-position at the bottom of the terrace.

•

Most vegetation that was cut, was found at the bottom of the terrace, so it is assumed
that vegetation already cut, was either thrown down from the top or allowed to roll
down over the uncleared area and allowed to drop down to the bottom of the terrace.

•

[Victim No.1]’s base stick was found on the bottom terrace with no lane marking
ropes attached to it, and the bottom boundary tape was not open to form a lane. No
blast / fragmentation damage could be found on it, so it can be assumed that it was
not being used. No other improvised methods for the use of the base stick was
authorised by the supervisor or the team leader.

•

While conducting an interview with him, he stated that he turned (to the left) to move
vegetation when he heard the detonation, which would account for his injuries only on
his right side.

•

[Victim No.1] also stated that once he heard the detonation and saw that the other
searcher, [Victim No.2], was bleeding, and moved down towards the base lane.

[Victim No.2]:
•

[Victim No.2], as per his statement, was not wearing any PPE when the detonation
occurred, it is not clear why he was not wearing his PPE, one can only assume he
removed it because he finished his area and was about to move to a new area and
forgot that [Victim No.1] was still working; taking this into account and the fact that it is
also not clear if he was 25m away when the detonation occurred, it could account for
the amount of fragmentation injuries he sustained.

•

Also, the searcher cutting vegetation, [Victim No.1], stated that he looked at [Victim
No.2] and saw him bleeding, this would be very difficult if he was 25m away, seeing
that the terrace makes a curve and would have made visibility difficult.

•

Victim No.2]’s mobile phone and hat were found at the bottom of the terrace wall that
was worked on by [Victim No.1].

The conduct of team leader, [Name removed], seems to be above suspicion, although there is
some concern with regards to his command & control skills, it must be noted that he is still
under probation as a new team leader; these concerns will be addressed by his supervisor.
The casualty evacuation was carried out in a well controlled, co-ordinated, safe and effective
manner.
The site safety was emphasised by the site supervisor and team leaders that morning
stressing the importance of careful vegetation cutting & locator search drills.
In all probability, the sub-munition was disturbed during the movement of the cut vegetation,
causing it to detonate. This is supported by the lack of fragmentation / blast damage to any of
the hand tools.
This accident is regarded as preventable.
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The detonation was caused by an M77 being moved as a result of cutting or moving
vegetation.

Recommendations
30. It is recommended that:
•

Strict supervision of the all BAC searchers is reinforced and to be maintained by the
Site Supervisor and Team Leaders with particular emphasis on gentle, slow
vegetation cutting drills and using the locator prior to vegetation cutting to check for
the presence of sub-munition.

•

Shift duration is monitored and reduced as the ambient temperature rises.

•

Both [Victim No.1] and [Victim No.2] should undergo a full BAC training course of at
least 5 working days under close supervision. Although quite a few assumptions
have been made because of the lack of statement evidence from these two
members, both should be given a final written warning for their actions.

•

The team leader, [Name removed], should be given the opportunity to continue with
his team leader training, with particular attention to command & control techniques.

•

No follow-up actions are required for the supervisor, [Name removed] or the medics
involved.

Annexes: [Some made available, but no original statements]
Photographs
Register of documents: (separate file)
IMSMA Demining Accident report
Site specific documents
Refresher training program
Training attendance register
Site daily worksheets
Casualty evacuation & Medical reports
Witness statements

Signed: [Name removed] [International commercial demining agency] SL QA Officer
12 July 2007
Distribution. External: [International commercial demining agency] Managing Director; MACC
SL / LMAC
Internal: [International commercial demining agency] Programme Manager; Operations
Manager
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Victim Report
Victim number: 736

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 21

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 20 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor
Summary of injuries:
minor Arm
minor Back
severe Leg
COMMENT: See Medical report.

Medical report
From IMSMA report and BoI text:
Date of birth: 16/01/1986
The sketch shows injuries to right arm and lower limbs
Time before first hospital reached: 20 minutes
[Victim No.1] suffered injuries to his right ankle and a deep cut on his right buttocks.
[Victim No.1] suffered from deep cuts on his right ankle and light bruises to his right arm
around the elbow.
The medics stopped the bleeding from [Victim No.1] and at around 1239hrs transported him
to Jabel Amel Hospital, Tyre.
[Victim No.1] suffered severe injuries closer to his ankle and a deep cut on his right buttock.
[Victim No.1] Minor injuries to right leg and the right buttock.

Victim Report
Victim number: 737

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 21

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 18 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None

Long visor
Summary of injuries:
minor Arms
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minor Legs
severe Head
COMMENT: See Medical report.

Medical report
From IMSMA report:
Date of birth: 01/08/1985
The sketch shows injuries to right arm; upper limbs, lower limbs, head/neck
18 minutes until first hospital facility reached.
[Victim No.2] a deep cut on his thigh and cut to his head.
The casualty [Victim No.2] suffered injuries in the front of his thigh and a deep cut on the rear/
top of his head. The team leader arrived first and undertook first aid, prior to the arrival of the
medics.
When the medics arrived they stabilized the casualty and escorted him to hospital.
[Victim No.2] suffered injuries on his head and to the front of his thigh.
[Victim No.2] Minor injuries to left & right thighs, right arm, left forearm and head.
A CT-scan was done on [Victim No.2] and fragmentation could be seen in his wounds.

Analysis
This accident is classed as a “Missed-mine accident” because it seems that Victim No.1
initiated the submunition inside the area that he has already “cleared”. The lack of marking
inside the working area makes this uncertain.
The Primary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victims were not
working to their SOPs and their errors were not corrected. Fundamental safety rules – such
as the wearing of PPE, maintenance of safety distances and the clear delineation between
areas searched and not searched – were breached.
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the
investigators determined that the international “site supervisor had limited idea about the
operations on his site”, and sought to mislead the investigators about the true details of the
accident.
This accident investigation was ably conducted and the report is well detailed. So many basic
safety rules were breached that one cannot help wondering whether this was a case when the
suspension of operational accreditation to the International demining group would have been
justified? Perhaps not, if QA visits showed that this was an unusual state of affairs.
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